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RUSHING TO REGULATE: RETHINKING THE RBI’S 
DIRECTIVES ON PEER-TO-PEER REGULATIONS IN INDIA 
ABSTRACT 
Almost half of India still does not have a bank account, leaving millions of 
Indians unable to access traditional sources of credit. For these unbanked 
Indians, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms have become an important 
alternative credit source. A recent boom in P2P platforms caused the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) to create a regulatory framework for the P2P sector. This 
Comment seeks to address some of the issues concerning regulating an 
unconventional industry that provides a crucial service. First, it is argued that 
the RBI fundamentally mischaracterizes both the services P2P’s provide, and 
how P2P’s provide these services. The Comment then discusses challenges P2P 
regulation poses for the RBI, arguing that the RBI’s framework both over- and 
underregulates P2P platforms. Finally, this Comment recommends India adopt 
U.S. P2P regulations, allowing for an exemption-based approach to lending. 
Given that alternative credit is much needed in India, this comment hopes to 
better tailor current regulations, in order to avoid a total regulatory overhaul. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, banks scaled back lending, which meant 
small businesses and individuals were cut off from traditional sources of credit.1 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) platforms filled this lending vacuum by providing alternate 
sources of financing.2 Potential lenders match with borrowers through an online 
marketplace, allowing them to bypass traditional financial services middlemen.3 
While P2P lending started out as a relatively simple system for facilitating loans 
between individuals online, it has since grown into a complex system of 
technologies, institutions, and startups.4 
In India, the P2P sector is new, with only thirty P2P platforms registered as 
of 2016.5 However, India is a credit-strapped country, and, following 
 
 1 Special Report, From the People, for the People, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015) https://www. 
economist.com/news/special-report/21650289-will-financial-democracy-work-downturn-people-people. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id.; see also Sven C. Berger & Fabian Gleisner, Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic 
Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending, 2 BUS. RES. J. 39, 39 (May 2009). 
 5 RES. BANK OF INDIA, CONSULTATION PAPER ON PEER TO PEER LENDING 7 (Apr. 2016), 
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/CPERR280416.pdf. 
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demonetization, it is also cash-strapped.6 Of the sixty million small businesses 
in India, only thirty-three percent are able to access institutional credit.7 
Individuals, 80% of whom self-finance, face similar credit barriers, with 32% 
relying on friends or family, and another 12% raising funds from informal 
banking networks.8 Many of these potential borrowers are traditionally 
unbanked, have limited credit histories, and do not know how to navigate 
traditional banking institutions.9 Moreover, 40% of Indians still do not have a 
bank account.10 P2P lenders have taken note of these potential borrowers, and 
thirty lending platforms have collectively disbursed loans totaling $25 million 
USD.11 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) recognized the potential for Indian P2P 
growth when it noted that “this industry has the potential to disrupt the financial 
sector and throw surprise. A sound regulatory framework will prevent such 
surprises.”12 On October 4, 2017, the RBI issued a Master Direction bringing 
P2Ps under the RBI’s regulatory jurisdiction by classifying P2Ps as Non-
Banking Financial Companies (NBFC-P2Ps) under Section 451 of the RBI Act 
in an effort to stabilize the P2P sector.13 While many welcomed the structure 
 
 6 Manas Chakravarty, How Demonetisation Crippled Bank Lending, LIVEMINT (June 6, 2017), 
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/j6FWY6uYX5sGxcqW4WR1dN/How-demonetisation-crippled-bank-
lending.html (“Indeed, in the second half of FY2017, bank lending to rural Haryana, Punjab, Goa, Maharashtra 
and Kerala contracted. Lending to rural Maharashtra fell by as much as 9.2%. Putting that in perspective, bank 
loans in the second half of FY16 to rural Haryana increased by 18% and to rural Punjab by 12.2%, while rural 
Maharashtra saw an increase in lending of 5.8%. Not a single state had showed a contraction in rural lending in 
the second half of FY16. In other words, the slowdown in rural lending in the second half of FY17 was very 
abnormal and may be attributed largely to demonetisation.”). Demonetization refers to the Indian government’s 
decision on November 8, 2016 to remove all 500 and 1000 rupee banknotes from circulation. The High Economic 
Costs of India’s Demonetisation, Economist (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2017/01/07/the-high-economic-costs-of-indias-demonetisation. By removing eighty-six percent of 
cash in circulation the government hoped to curb the use of “black money.” Id. However, the move has been 
widely criticized for causing massive cash shortages that disproportionally impacted middle to low income 
Indians. Id. 
 7 Allen Taylor, Review of India Regulation on P2P Lending Market, LENDING TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://lending-times.com/2017/09/18/review-of-indian-regulation-on-p2p-market/ 
 8 Id. 
 9 Chethan Kumari, 40 Percent of India is Unbanked & Hurting the Most; Exchange of Currency 
Permitted Only Once Till RBI Review, TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 12, 2016), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 
business/india-business/40-of-India-is-unbanked-hurting-the-most-Exchange-Of-Currency-Permitted-Only-
Once-Till-RBI-Review/articleshow/55392031.cms.  
 10 Id. 
 11 Tarush Bhalla, Fintech Startups Join Hands to Form India’s First P2P Lending Association, 
YOURSTORY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://yourstory.com/2018/01/fintech-startups-join-hands-form-indias-first-
p2p-lending-association (“India has around 30 online P2P lending platforms with a loan book of approximately 
$25 million.”). 
 12 CONSULTATION PAPER ON PEER TO PEER LENDING, supra note 5, at 9. 
 13 Master Directions - Non-Banking Financial Company – Peer to Peer Lending Platform (Reserve Bank) 
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these regulations provided, others are wary of the prudential and governance 
requirements NBFC-P2Ps now have to meet.14 
This Comment argues that in trying to structure the P2P sector, the RBI has 
substantially overregulated the industry by misunderstanding the innovative 
contributions of P2Ps. By misclassifying P2Ps as NBFCs, the RBI imposed 
inappropriate prudential and governance regulations. This Comment focuses on 
the most common form of P2P lending: unsecured consumer loans brokered 
between strangers through an online platform. Section II explains how P2Ps 
currently function in India, how P2Ps are uniquely suited to extending credit to 
Indian consumers, and why the industry must be encouraged. Extending credit 
to the traditionally unbanked is key for developing Indian financial markets.  
Section III documents the problems P2P lending poses for Indian regulators 
and examines why RBI regulations do not adequately address the problems 
presented. Part IV concludes by recommending that India should adopt a U.S.-
style exemption approach to P2P regulation. The U.S. approach allows the RBI 
to avoid a total regulatory overhaul and instead focus on tailoring P2P 
regulations. 
Many P2P regulators welcome RBI regulation.15 This Comment does not 
argue that the Indian P2P sector should remain unregulated, but rather considers 
whether the RBI regulations sufficiently address the regulatory challenges P2Ps 
pose. By building on scholarship analyzing global P2P regulation, this Comment 
hopes to offer a model of Indian P2P regulation that allows for increased and 
more equitable financial access.  
 
Directions, Res. Bank of India (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id= 
11137&Mode=0, [hereinafter Master Directions] 
 14 Shivasnkari Bhuvaneswaran, What Do Prominent P2P Players Think of the RBI Regulations?, 
FINEXTRA: BLOGS (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/14376/what-do-prominent-p2p-
players-think-of-the-rbi-regulations; Pratik Bhakta, Rs. 10 Lakh Limit on P2P Lending Will Hurt Industry: P2P 
Startup Founders, ETTECH: STARTUPS (Oct. 7, 2017), https://tech.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/startups/ 
rs-10-lakh-limit-on-p2p-lending-will-hurt-industry-p2p-startup-founders/60980922 (“‘The Rs. 10-lakh limit for 
both borrowers and lenders is a major detriment to the sector as a whole, it is too low and should be revised 
upwards,’ said Sanjay Darbha, founder of Peerlend, a Hyderabad-based P2P startup. ‘Such low limits will push 
people to cash borrowings from expensive money lenders and defeat the entire purpose around P2P lending.’ 
Echoing similar fears, Shankar Vaddadi, founder of another P2P startup iLend, said high net-worth individuals 
with higher disposable corpus would be discouraged from participating in this sector in the wake of such 
limitations.”). 
 15 Bhuvaneswaran, supra note 14. 
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I. INDIAN P2PS AND THE DREAM OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Of the estimated 260 million Indians (or 26% of the population) who live in 
poverty, approximately 193 million (or 74%) live in rural areas.16 The majority 
of these rural poor Indians have no access to formal credit sources.17 As a result, 
they are forced to rely on informal finance, mainly from moneylenders, who are 
free to charge exorbitant interest rates.18 There is also the issue of bias—fifty-
eight percent of surveyed Indians reported that it is difficult for them to get 
access to credit because of their gender, ethnicity, or religion.19 These 
populations are further disadvantaged when their lack of credit access prevents 
them from building credit histories for future loans.20 
Access to credit is similarly out-of-reach for most small Indian businesses. 
Close to eighty percent of small businesses have no links with formal financial 
institutions.21 A study by the Nachiket Mor Committee noted that on the demand 
side, small businesses have “limited managerial capabilities and financial 
management skills, lack appropriate documents, and require small ticket size 
loans.”22 The study further notes that on the supply side “banks lack credit 
information about the clients, classify small businesses loans as risky, and see 
financing to small enterprises as a low revenue activity.”23  
P2P platforms address, to varying degrees, all of these credit-access 
bottlenecks in India. First, P2Ps have no physical location and all transactions 
 
 16 PRIYA BASU, IMPROVING ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR INDIA’S RURAL POOR xxvii (2006). 
 17 Id. at xvi. 
 18 Id.  
 19 Press Trust of India, Religious, Gender Bias Greater in India for Jobs, Credit: Study, BUS. STANDARD, 
(May 11, 2015), http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/religious-gender-bias-greater-in-india-
for-jobs-credit-study-115051100075_1.html. 
 20 BASU, supra note 16, at xvi. 
 21 Charan Singh and Kishinchand Poornima Wasdani, Finance for Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in India: Sources and Challenges (ADBI, Working Paper 581, 2016), https://www.adb.org/sites/ 
default/files/publication/188868/adbi-wp581.pdf (“According to International Finance Corporation (2012), the 
supply of finance to the MSME sector is estimated to be 32.5 trillion Indian rupees (Rs). This total comprises 
contributions from informal finance, formal finance, and self-finance. Informal sources and self-finance 
contribute Rs25.5 trillion to the sector, of which informal finance accounts for Rs24.4 trillion. In other words, 
78% of the finance used by MSMEs is met by informal sources and self-finance. The remaining 22% (Rs6.9 
trillion) is provided by banks and NBFCs, of which banks provide the bulk (91.8%).”). 
 22 Anup Singh, Abhapy Pareek, & Raunak Kapoor, Expanding Access to Finance for Small Businesses 
in India: A Critique of the Mor Committee’s Approach Why Are The Banks Not Financing Small Businesses?, 
MICROSAVE CONSULTING: BLOG (May 2014), http://blog.microsave.net/expanding-access-to-finance-for-small-
businesses-in-india-a-critique-of-the-mor-committees-approach-part-2-why-are-the-banks-not-financing-
small-businesses/. 
 23 Id. 
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are conducted electronically.24 By adopting a web-only presence, these lenders 
are able to cut costs that are incurred in traditional banking.25 For example, the 
table below compares the operating costs of a leading U.S. P2P platform, 
Lending Club. to a traditional bank, Zion Bank and demonstrates that the 
Lending Club’s operating expenses are significantly lower than Zion Bank’s.26 
 
Operating Expense Comparison – Lending Club vs. Traditional Bank 
(All figures in USD) Lending Club Zions Bank 
Net Loan Revenues  $211  $1818 
Sales, Marketing and 
Advertising  $87  $23 
Total Op Ex  $243  $1714 
Op Ex less Sales & Marketing  $155  $1691 
(Op Ex – Sales & Mktg.)/ 
Net Loan 74 percent 93 percent 
A fully digital platform, alongside rising smartphone ownership, means P2P 
technology is an increasingly accessible financial option for the traditionally 
unbanked.27 P2P platforms are especially useful in rural areas where it is 
uneconomical for traditional banks to build branches when transactions are 
 
 24 Berger & Gleisner, supra note 4, at 39.  
 25 Id. at 41 (“Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure 
conditions . . . significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional 
intermediaries . . . .”). 
 26 Saurabh Sharma, P2P Lending and Big Data: Banking on the Non-Banks, CROWDFUNDBEAT, 
https://crowdfundbeat.com/2015/03/27/p2p-lending-and-big-data-banking-on-the-non-banks/ (last visited Aug. 
27, 2018). 
 27 Smitha Verma, Unbanked Population: How Alternative Financial Services Ecosystem has Become Big 
Boon for India, Fin. Express (Oct. 22, 2017, 1:26 AM), http://www.financialexpress.com/economy/unbanked-
population-how-alternative-financial-services-ecosystem-has-become-big-boon-for-india/901477/ (“For a 
country with a large unbanked population, the alternative financial services ecosystem has come as a big boon. 
Customers, who were mostly shown the door by traditional banks, now have an instant, hassle-free and 
accessible solution at the tap of a key.”). 
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small.28 Rural Indians no longer have to travel miles to access a credit 
interface.29 
Second, by eliminating the banking intermediary, P2Ps can offer low rates 
for borrowers, high returns for lenders, and increase overall credit access.30 
Platforms use a reverse auction model, in which lenders bid for a borrower’s 
loan proposal, and the borrower has the freedom to either accept or reject the 
offer.31 Because loan making is so decentralized, borrowers and lenders can 
unbundle any unnecessary or unwanted services otherwise required by 
traditional intermediaries.32 Tailoring loans this way significantly lowers 
associated overhead costs.33 Low lending costs make it profitable to disburse 
much smaller loans.34 These smaller loans require less collateral capital and are 
thus much more suited to the credit needs of small businesses and rural 
individuals.35 In 2016, almost thirty-four percent of borrowers were 
entrepreneurs who used P2Ps to secure enough cash to expand operations.36  
 
 
 28 BASU, supra note 16, at 11. (“On average, a rural bank branch in India serves almost three times the 
number of people served by a non-rural branch . . . . The volume of deposits and credit in rural areas is also 
much lower than in urban areas. Per capita deposits in rural areas stood at Rs2,150 (US$47) or around 10 percent 
of national per capita GDP in 2001, compared to Rs33,780 (US$740) or around 160 percent of per capita GDP 
in the same year for urban areas. Credit per person in rural areas stood at Rs900 (US$20) or around 4 percent of 
national per capita GDP versus a figure of Rs20,600 (US$450) for urban areas, which is around 100 percent of 
national per capita GDP. The number of credit accounts in rural areas relative to the total rural population 
amounts to only 3.4 percent against a ratio nearly three times higher for urban areas.”). 
 29 Id. at 20 (“In general, frequency of visits to formal financial institutions is low, with the main reason 
for infrequent visits being the high costs related to travel time/transport.”). 
 30 Rajat Gandhi, What the Future Holds for the P2P Lending Market in India and the World, PLUNGE 
DAILY (June 16, 2017), https://mybigplunge.com/opinion/what-the-future-holds-for-the-p2p-lending-market-in-
india-faircent/ (“P2P lending offers the advantage of fixed and higher returns not vulnerable to market 
turbulence, and that’s where it is winning over traditional market-linked investment instruments.”). 
 31 Bill Snyder, Exploring Auction Models for Peer-to-Peer Lending, STAN. BUS. INSIGHTS (Apr. 1, 2011), 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/exploring-auction-models-peer-peer-lending. 
 32 Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 460–
61 (2011). 
 33 ALISTAIR MILNE & PAUL PARBOTEEAH, THE BUSINESS MODELS AND ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER 
LENDING 4 (May 2016) (“The focused nature of their activities ensures that the administrative and overhead 
costs required for setting up a P2P platform are relatively low.”). 
 34 Id. (“Some individuals and small businesses that do not satisfy the more stringent criteria that banks 
now place on granting loans can, through peer-to-peer lending services, find alternative lenders who are willing 
to take on the risk of providing such loans or to offer them at lower rates of interest.”). 
 35 Id.; see also Aman Malik, RBI’s P2P Lending Norms: A Step Backward or Forward?, VCCIRCLE 
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.vccircle.com/rbis-new-p2p-lending-norms-a-step-backward-or-forward/ (“P2P 
lenders, most of whom operate online, typically help borrowers get loans without collateral . . . .”). 
 36 Bhuvaneswaran, supra note 14. 
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                                                                                                                      37 
Third, P2P platforms offer ways for populations who have limited 
identification documents and credit histories to access loans. When assessing 
whether to issue a loan to an individual, banks assess the creditworthiness of the 
borrower.38 Depending on a risk-assessment of their credit history, a bank will 
determine if an individual is eligible for a loan and the terms of the loan.39 The 
more favorable the credit history of the individual, the better the terms of the 
loan.40 However, credit data is hard to find for people who do not participate in 
traditional banking structures.41 Underwriting is also a labor intensive and time-
consuming process that does not make financial sense for a small business 
 
 37 Anothony Zeoli, Peer to Peer Lending: Taking the Fear Out of “Shadow Banking”, CROWDFUND 
INSIDER (May 27, 2015), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/05/68355-peer-to-peer-lending-taking-the-
fear-out-of-shadow-banking/. 
 38 Rajkamal Iyer et al., Screening in New Credit Markets: Can Individual Lenders Infer Borrower 
Creditworthiness in Peer-to-Peer Lending?, AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper 1 (Mar. 2010), http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1570115 (“Traditionally, banks have played the dominant role in allocating credit partly 
because they are attributed to have the financial expertise to evaluate borrowers and effectively intermediate 
capital . . . .”). 
 39 Id.  
 40 Bruce D. Smith, Taking Intermediation Seriously, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING, 1319, 1321–22 
(2003). 
 41 Corinne Abrams, Are You a Credit Risk? Indian Banks Dig Deep in Your Phone to Find Out, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-you-a-credit-risk-indian-banks-dig-deep-in-your-
phone-to-find-out-1511433007. 
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looking for a small loan.42 While P2Ps engage in traditional underwriting, they 
also use big data analytics to determine a borrower’s creditworthiness.43 By 
analyzing social media activity, mobile phone usage, and whatever demographic 
material the borrower provides, P2Ps can identify, score, and underwrite credit 
for low- and middle-income consumers who lack a formal credit history.44 
Nearly three-quarters of borrowers on Faircent, an Indian P2P Platform, have a 
score of less than 700, below the threshold at which the banks determined 
lending is too risky or uneconomical.45 Lending to people with poor credit 
background can mean higher interest rates.46 But the only alternate options for 
those historically unable to access traditional banks are informal money lending 
arrangements, with no legal protections or supervision.47 Given limited options, 
comparatively high-interest P2P loans are the best choice. Some scholarship 
points toward data analytics, like that done by P2P, being a much more accurate 
form of risk-management in comparison to traditional credit underwriting.48 
Furthermore, even borrowers with risky credit ratings may be able to find 
philanthropic lenders through P2P platforms. 
Fourth, P2Ps open up investing opportunities to underserved populations by 
allowing multiple lenders to finance loans. Unlike with traditional lending in 
which a loan has a single lender—usually a bank—P2Ps allow loans to be 
fulfilled by multiple lenders.49 Lenders also can manage risk easily by lending 
small amounts to many borrowers.50 P2P loans are also better insulated than 
 
 42 Sharma, supra note 26 (“Small businesses, whose capital needs are usually underserved by banks who 
opt to avoid engaging in the labor-intensive underwriting process when smaller numbers are involved, benefit 
from the borrowing options offered through these platforms.”). 
 43 Id. (“For lenders on P2P platforms, private individuals can enjoy a much higher return than today’s 
savings accounts or other low risk investments offer. Institutional lenders can have direct access to the previously 
difficult to reach consumer finance asset class.”). 
 44 Id.  
 45 Nishant Sharma, P2P Lending: In Game of Loans, RBI Arms a New Player, QUINT (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.thequint.com/news/business/rbi-with-a-new-p2p-lending-system. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Vinnie Lauria, Here’s Everything You Should Know About Alternative Lending in Asia, FORBES (Mar. 
13, 2017, 12:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/vinnielauria/2017/03/13/heres-everything-you-should-
know-about-alternative-lending-in-asia/#39558600113e (“P2P interest rates may be higher than those of 
traditional loans, but in India’s mostly cash economy, they are the only option for many. For people who have 
been historically neglected by traditional banks, the popularity of P2P lending in India continues to rise.”). 
 48 Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 148, 
148 (2016). 
 49 Vinay Mathews, P2P Lending: The Real Benefits and Ways to Mitigate Risk, YOURSTORY (Nov. 21, 
2016), https://yourstory.com/2016/11/p2p-lending-risk-mitigatigation/ (“Investing small amounts across a large 
number of diversified loans will likely keep default rate at a reasonable and consistent level, thereby increasing 
returns.”). 
 50 Id.  
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stocks from market downturns, leaving lenders better protected in recessions.51 
In the case of one borrower defaulting, lenders are still relatively unaffected. 
Unlike informal lending networks, there are legal recourses available if a 
borrower does not repay a loan.52 This allows rural individuals to invest modest 
amounts and have steady monthly incomes.  
Finally, increased P2P use has the potential to bring more transparency and 
clarity to the larger credit market. Traditional banks pool, divide, and sell 
consumer credit loans to investors.53 This mixing and packaging makes 
traditional loans complex enough to diffuse accountability in the case of 
defaults.54 However, P2P borrowers know the particular lenders to which they 
are liable, and all P2P lenders know which particular borrowers make their 
payments. If P2P returns fall, lenders know immediately which loans defaulted 
and can adjust accordingly, either by modifying their portfolio strategies or 
leaving the marketplace altogether. 
P2P platforms solve some of the most pressing credit access problems in 
India, without requiring any substantial infrastructure development. However, 
the P2P model does signal a need for regulation to address some serious 
concerns about consumer and investor protection.  
II. WHAT THE RBI ADDRESSES, WHAT IT MISUNDERSTANDS, AND WHAT IT 
MISSES 
While the P2P sector is still small in comparison to the overall Indian 
financing sector, legislators, investors, and P2P platforms themselves have 
called for some type of regulation.55 Legislators want to set best practices for the 
sector, investors want regulatory clarity, and platforms want credibility.56 But 
the unconventional nature of the P2P model puts them in a regulatory grey 
space.57 Unlike banks, P2P platforms do not conduct any direct lending, 
 
 51 Id. (“In 2008–09, the stock market had crashed, losing more than 55 percent of its value but globally, 
P2P loans didn’t stop and borrowers continued to pay lenders money.”). 
 52 Id. (“The platform should facilitate the signing of a legally-binding agreement as well as collection and 
holding of borrowers’ post-dated cheques which can be used by the lender to initiate criminal proceedings in 
case of default.”). 
 53 Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed To Prevent 
the CDO Meltdown, and How To Fix It, U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1361–63 (2009). 
 54 Id.  
 55 Bhuvaneswaran, supra note 14.  
 56 Id.; PTI, ‘NBFC Status to P2P Puts Compliance Burden; Lending To Go Up’, MONEYCONTROL (Oct. 
9, 2017), http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/nbfc-status-to-p2p-puts-compliance-burden-lending-to-
go-up-2407535.html. 
 57 Jitendra Soni & Kanad Bagchi, RBI Paper on Peer-to-Peer Lending: A Case of Unmindful 
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including accepting deposits.58 Instead, arrangement fees make up the bulk of a 
P2P platform’s income.59 P2P platforms exist in a middle ground where they 
simply facilitate lender-borrower connections, but do not engage in directly 
providing any financial services.60  
In order to regulate P2Ps, the Reserve Bank of India had to first decide how 
to classify P2Ps. On October 4, 2017, the RBI issued a Master Directive that 
brought P2Ps under its jurisdiction by classifying them as NBFC-P2Ps under 
Section 451 of the RBI Act.61 This classification subjected P2Ps to a slew of 
reporting, prudential, and governance requirements.62 These guidelines provided 
some much-needed clarity—but they also misunderstood, and so misregulate, a 
much-needed service. First, it is unclear whether classifying P2Ps as NBFCs is 
legally justified. Second, the RBI’s prudential and governance regulations take 
an archaic regulatory approach that can inhibit P2P growth. Third, the RBI 
regulations leave key consumer protection and investing issues unaddressed.   
A. Can P2Ps Be NBFCs? 
Indian banking laws allow the RBI to regulate both “banks” and “non-
banks.”63 To perform lending and borrowing activities, banks have to receive 
banking licenses from the RBI.64 Similarly, non-banks engaged in “financial 
activity’” have to obtain certificates of registration from the RBI.65 To determine 
whether a company is engaged in financial activity, the RBI applies the 
“principal business” or “50-50 Test.”66 The assets and income stream of a 
company are examined from their most current balance sheet.67 If a company’s 
income from the financial services it performs is more than fifty percent of its 
gross income, then the company will be classified as a “NBFC.”68  
 
Contradictions, WIRE (May 23, 2017), https://thewire.in/37842/rbi-paper-on-peer-to-peer-lending-a-case-of-
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 62 Master Directions, supra note 13. 
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 66 Press Release, Res. Bank India, Amendment to NBFC Regulations - Certificate of Registration (CoR) 
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Auditors Certificate - Clarification (Oct. 19, 2006), https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/PDFs/73378. 
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In traditional lending—where an institution accepts deposits on their balance 
sheet and in turn loans out capital—the 50-50 Test easily applies. Simply put, 
under the 50-50 Test, a traditional lender is classified as an NBFC if the interest 
collected from their loans is fifty percent of their gross income.69 But P2P 
platforms do not lend out any of their own funds or accept deposits from lenders 
or borrowers.70 Their primary source of income is from commissions or 
arrangement fees that are basically service charges that lenders and borrowers 
pay for using their platforms.71 Given that P2Ps do not issue loans—they simply 
facilitate them, and so cannot collect interest on those loans—it is unclear how 
to apply the 50-50 Test to P2Ps.  
While it is too early for any legal challenges to have taken place, Indian 
courts could conclude that the 50-50 Test does not apply to P2Ps. Given the lack 
of clarity as to whether P2Ps can be classified as NBFCs, it can be argued that 
the RBI is overstepping and trying to regulate a tech company—which simply 
happens to be in the financial sector—as an NBFC. Such a ruling would place 
P2Ps outside the regulatory jurisdiction of the RBI, as the RBI can only regulate 
companies that predominantly engage in banking or financial activity.72 P2P 
leaders are already pushing to be classified as separate, primarily technological 
entities, rather than as NBFCs.73 
However, the RBI can circumvent the 50-50 Test if it consults with the 
government and invoke special powers to classify an entity as an NBFC.74 It 
seems the RBI might have waived the 50-50 Test for P2Ps. The RBI did this in 
the past with mortgage guarantee companies and account aggregators.75 In both 
these cases, however, the companies were exempted from the NBFC prudential 
and governance requirements to which P2Ps are subject.76 
If the goal of the RBI is to provide structure and clarity to the P2P sector, it 
must either explain how the 50-50 Test applies to P2Ps or provide justification 
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 74 Res. Bank India, Non-Banking Finance Companies in India’s Financial Landscape, RBI BULL. 91, 94–
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for why NBFC requirements apply to entities outside the RBI’s traditional 
regulatory sphere.  
B. Archaic Prudential and Governance Requirements 
Under the RBI directive, P2Ps as NBFCs are subject to pre-existing 
prudential and governance regulations, the same regulations that apply to 
traditional lenders.77 There are three primary prudential norms: 
1. All P2PS must have net-owned funds of more than Rs. 2 crore 
(approx. $31,000 USD).78  
2. P2Ps must maintain a leverage ratio of two (i.e., outside liabilities 
of a platform must not exceed two times its owned funds).79 
3. The maximum that a single lender can lend and the maximum that 
a single borrower can borrow across all P2P platforms is Rs. 10 
lakhs, (approx. $10,500 USD). The maximum that a single lender 
can lend to a single borrower across all P2P platforms is Rs. 50,000 
(approx. $770 USD).80 
These capital requirements, leverage ratios, and caps are absolutely 
necessary in traditional banking. Banks lend long-term loans against short-term 
deposits. Thus, unexpected deposit withdrawals or surges in loan defaults can 
bring banks to the edge of insolvency.81 Regulations imposing stringent capital 
and leverage ratio requirements insulate banks from liquidity concerns and 
balance sheet mismatches.82 Simply, traditional banking and lending is a capital-
heavy operation; therefore, regulators must ensure that there is always enough 
capital on hand to absorb losses.83  
However, P2P lending is not a capital-heavy lending model. Operating costs 
are currently minimal. For most P2Ps, technology (e.g., online platform set-up 
and upkeep) and human capital (e.g., salaries and other remunerations) are the 
only major expenditures.84 There are neither property rental nor maintenance 
 
 77 Master Directions, supra note 13.  
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Q. REV. 14, 20 (2000).  
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  
 84 MILNE & PARBOTEEAH, supra note 37. 
MINUPURICOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19 5/23/2019 10:25 AM 
2019] RUSHING TO REGULATE 445 
costs for physical locations. Moreover, scaling-up does not require new 
branches, and administrative costs are minimal.85 The question is: why require 
P2Ps to have and maintain a minimum Rs. 2 crore of net-owned funds? The RBI 
justifies the requirement by arguing that mandating a minimal capital 
requirement ensures that only serious companies can participate.86 However, 
currently, there are only thirty registered P2Ps in India, and P2P lending takes 
up a tiny fraction of the larger consumer credit sector.87 An oversaturation of the 
P2P market by small-time companies should not be a primary concern. Rather, 
the focus should be on developing regulations that promote growth. The Rs. 2 
crore requirement has already proven prohibitive to some P2P platforms. Sunil 
Kumar, the founder of the P2P LoanMeet, said the amount was too large and 
would hurt most P2P lending marketplaces. He noted, “[w]e need some time, at 
least a year, to raise that kind of money.”88 However, existing P2P companies 
only have a three-month window to meet all of the new RBI requirements.89 
Given that P2P platforms are capitalized at tens of lakhs with modest debt-equity 
ratios, a proportional capital base dependent on the size of a P2P portfolio is 
more prudent.90 Having a Rs. 2 crore minimum might force cash-strapped, but 
otherwise well performing, P2P platforms out of business. 
Mandating a leverage ratio is also similarly inappropriate for the P2P lending 
model and slows P2P growth. In traditional lending, leverage ratios are a way to 
ensure that a company will be able to honor its financial obligations. Companies 
can only lend, or carry debts in their books, in proportion to the amount of capital 
on hand.91 But once again, P2Ps do not carry any debt and they do not directly 
lend. As VSSB Shankar, the founder of i-lend, noted: “The question of leverage 
ratio doesn’t arise when you’re not lending on your balance sheet.”92 The RBI 
argues that a prescribed leverage ratio ensures that “platforms do not expand 
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with indiscriminate leverage.”93 But in the P2P model, lending on the platform 
is not tied into how much debt the P2P company has. The platform is not the 
lender; the lender is an independent third party that is not bound by the leverage 
ratio. Mandating a leverage ratio offers no protection or value to the P2P model.  
Capping amounts borrowers and lenders can transact again misses the mark 
and substantially burdens P2Ps. While P2P platforms facilitate, on average, 
smaller loans than traditional lenders, setting such a low cap for borrowers and 
lenders cuts off the possibility of P2P platforms drawing in high net-worth 
individuals.94 For three out of the four leading Indian P2P platforms, this cap 
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Sanjay Darbha, founder of Peerlend, noted, “Such low limits will push 
people to cash borrowings from expensive money lenders and defeat the entire 
purpose around P2P lending.”96 The cap significantly restricts P2P growth, as 
now P2Ps can only grow by bringing many more borrowers and lenders into the 
platform.  
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RBI regulations also prohibit P2Ps from participating in lending activities or 
in financial transactions apart from being simple intermediaries.97 Given their 
now limited revenue streams, P2Ps might not be able to bear the additional costs 
of complying with RBI requirements. There will also be significant restructuring 
costs for many P2Ps. For example, considering the fact that NBFCs are to be 
regarded as companies, P2P firms that are currently registered as LLPs or 
partnerships will be required to restructure.98 The RBI regulations have 
considerably increased entry barriers while restricting P2P platforms’ abilities 
to explore options for mitigating increased costs. 
C. What P2P Platforms and Consumers are Still Waiting for 
By trying to control P2Ps through traditional—and often inapplicable—
capital regulations, the RBI has overlooked two key P2P areas that require much 
clarification. The RBI has failed to address P2P remittance transactions and data 
security for P2P users. 
D. P2Ps and Remittances 
India is the largest remittance recipient in the world.99 The majority of Indian 
remittances are small in amount, with transactions under Rs. 20,000 (approx. 
$300 USD) making up forty-three percent of remittances in 2010.100 A large 
proportion of remittances are sent by migrant laborers to families in rural 
areas.101 Given the low incomes of remitters, and the small amounts involved, 
remittance transfers can be quite costly.102 The smaller the remittance size, the 
higher the transaction cost percentage for formal banking to be the cheapest 
option the remittance must be around Rs. 94,000 (approx. $1500 USD).103 Most 
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rural remittances are not large enough to make formal banking an affordable 
option.  
Even if someone in a rural area wants to make a small remittance through 
formal channels, villages rarely have banks or agents.104 A study from the Centre 
for Micro Finance in India shows that making a transfer through a bank requires 
an average of fifteen minutes of travel and forty-five minutes of wait time for 
senders, then another forty minutes of travel and fifty minutes of wait time for 
recipients.105 An average transfer would take two and a half hours.106 In 
comparison, transferring remittances through informal channels takes on 
average twenty-eight minutes total.107 Cost and access barriers force an 
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However, while informal channels are easier to access and cheaper for many 
Indians, they also exist outside formal regulations.109 P2P platforms significantly 
cut transaction costs for small remittances, while offering regulatory 
protections.110 P2Ps cut remittance costs by matching outgoing and incoming 
remittances. For example, if an individual in any other country wants to transfer 
money to another individual in India, the individual would then give the money 
to a P2P office in the transferor’s country. The P2P platform then scouts for a 
person in India transferring the same amount of money to the transferor’s 
country. Next, the P2P platform matches these two transactions to transfer 
money within the borders of the respective countries. By ensuring that no money 
actually leaves a country, P2Ps eliminate extra costs. 
However, the Indian rupee is not freely convertible.111 To buy, sell, or covert 
the rupee, an individual needs explicit legal authorization.112 These regulations 
set the price of the rupee by limiting the yearly volume that can be converted 
and the entities that can transact rupees.113 The new RBI regulations 
unambiguously state that the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), and 
its rupee conversion restrictions, apply to all P2P platforms.114 As a result, P2P 
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platforms under FEMA Sections 3(a) and (b) explicitly prohibit any payment “to 
or for the credit of any person resident outside India in any manner.”115  
More so, any transaction in which the sender and receiver are not both Indian 
residents qualifies as a cross-border transaction; this triggers even more 
restrictions under Indian law.116 The RBI regulations explicitly prohibit P2Ps 
from engaging in any cross-border activities.117 The only way for a P2P to work 
around these restrictions is to submit an application to the Indian Banks 
Association asking to conduct inbound international transactions.118 Outbound 
international transactions require separate applications.119 Then, the Indian 
Banks Association can make a recommendation to the RBI, and the RBI has the 
final say regarding whether an organization can conduct a cross-border 
transaction.120 As Dilip Ratha—the manager of migration and remittances at the 
World Bank—notes, “[t]he technology to provide remittance service for cheap 
is already there. Because of regulations, new players with efficient technology 
are not able to get into the market.”121 
Companies that want to capitalize on the informal remittance market look to 
work around RBI restrictions by adopting a Unified Payment Interface (UPI) 
approach.122 The UPI method assigns each user a ”unique virtual address” on a 
smartphone.123 Users can then transfer money from one address to another. The 
catch is that each user must have an existing bank account.124 Unlike P2P 
transfers that use virtual wallets and do not require a bank account, the UPI 
method is essentially a cross-bank transfer. Because many rural Indians face 
considerable barriers to bank access, forcing P2P platforms to adopt a UPI 
method results in the exclusion of rural Indians from formal banking and its 
protections. The RBI’s guidelines overregulate a key potential use of P2P 
platforms for rural Indians. 
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E. P2P Data Security Concerns 
While the RBI’s approach to P2Ps over-regulate, and also severely under-
regulate, setting data and cyber security standards for P2P platforms. The RBI 
regulations require all P2Ps to follow stringent Know Your Customer (KYC) 
guidelines.125 KYC norms require that all P2Ps store and verify documents to 
establish the names and addresses of all customers.126 Indian banks have always 
been subject to KYC norms; however, banks only have to comply with KYC 
norms when a transaction exceeds a certain amount.127 However, in an effort to 
battle money laundering, the RBI now requires P2P to fully comply with all 
KYC norms in transactions as low as Rs. 10,000 (approx. $157 USD).128 
Previously, digital transfers were subject to only minimum KYC norms and 
required only a phone number verification.129 However, now the RBI requires 
full KYC norms, which can be “tedious, complicated[,] and expensive” for many 
users.130  
While financial transactions must be secure, the RBI fails to understand that 
the ease of P2P use drew previously unbanked individuals closer towards formal 
financial institutions. Current regulations require P2Ps to ensure that lenders 
knows details about the borrowers’ personal identities.131 However, before the 
new regulations, both borrowers and lenders could rely on the P2P platform to 
use data from social media accounts or past informal credit history to create a 
reliable picture of all parties involved in a transaction.132 Now, the RBI’s KYC 
norms place the burden on clients to prove their identities and addresses through 
a cumbersome point-based list of Officially Valid Documents (OVD).133 There 
is no option to substitute social medial posts, or anything not enumerated in the 
guidelines, for an OVD.134 Given that a large swath of new P2P users were 
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traditionally unbanked, it is likely that the P2P users will not have easy access 
to OVDs. The more complex the KYC system, the greater the risk that someone 
will choose to circumvent a formal credit system for an unregulated alternative.  
Even if clients do manage to produce OVDs, the “KYC process [remains] 
tedious, complicated and expensive” for P2P platforms.135 For example, if a 
client manages to produce a passport, the P2P platform must verify that the 
passport belongs to the client, is valid, and does not register on any blacklists. 
To cut down on KYC costs, P2P platforms require clients to come to their 
offices, go to a partner officer for verification, or use a courier service to 
complete the KYC process.136 Traveling to an office may provide prohibitive for 
rural Indians; it may also defeat the purpose of having a digital banking service 
whenever and wherever you need it. Jitendra Gupta, the managing director of a 
P2P platform, notes that the KYC norms “destroy the idea of a wallet as an 
intermediate option for customers; they might as well open a bank account 
now.”137 Requiring a client to use a partner or courier service for verification 
might also prove prohibitive for P2P platforms. The cost of verification for each 
client ranges between fifteen and thirty USD. 138 Although most P2P transactions 
are small, the verification costs still can make previously viable transactions 
unprofitable. Established banks may be able to absorb these costs; however, 
smaller P2P platforms may be unable to do so.139 Sriram Jagannathan, the vice 
president of payments at Amazon India, issued a statement on behalf of many 
P2P platforms, urging the RBI “to re-examine this in line with international 
guidelines, and adopt a framework of proportional KYC.”140 
Of more concern is full compliance with KYC guidelines that entail massive 
collection of personal data. The RBI’s regulations are silent on how this data 
should be stored and protected.141 The Kaspersky Cybersecurity Index contends 
that “India is one of the most vulnerable countries to attacks by banking 
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malware.”142 The Indian Secretary at the Ministry of Electronics and 
Information Technology noted, “‘Mobile is a dangerous device with the kind of 
data it is leaking.’”143 And recently, a data security breach in India potentially 
exposed the entire population’s personal data.144 Subsequently, in November 
2017, more than 200 government websites inadvertently published the banking 
details of thousands of citizens.145 The Indian government understands the 
precarious state of Indian cyber security—two working groups from the RBI and 
the Department of Telecom will establish guidelines on cyber security standards 
for mobile applications and devices.146 
However, there is no set date for when these guidelines will be released—
the working groups hope to release the guidelines soon.147 While data security 
timelines are vague, the RBI has set very clear deadlines by which P2Ps must 
comply with all KYC norms.148 All existing P2P platforms were given until 
December 31, 2017 to fully comply with KYC norms.149 Unable to meet this 
deadline, many platforms have asked for extensions. The RBI is currently 
considering these applications.150 If the RBI, without addressing data security 
concerns, continues to rush forward with KYC compliance, it threatens the 
future of a crucial industry.  
All Indian P2P stakeholders recognize the need for regulation. However, the 
RBI regulations, even if only an initial step in a larger regulatory regime, stand 
to hinder P2P access and growth. The current scheme overregulates areas critical 
to P2P growth while simultaneously leaving other crucial areas completely 
unregulated. Moving forward, the RBI needs to significantly restructure their 
approach to P2P lending if it is to be kept attractive and accessible. The U.S. 
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P2P platform exemption regime offers an alternative framework for P2P 
regulation in India.  
III. WHAT IS NEXT FOR INDIAN P2PS? LESSONS FROM THE U.S. P2P MODEL 
The current Indian P2P industry closely resembles its early U.S. counterpart. 
Much like in India, early U.S. P2P platforms were largely self-regulated.151 
These P2Ps initially comprised a small fraction of U.S. financial markets.152 
However, as in India, the rapid growth of these unregulated platforms caught the 
eye of government regulators.153 In 2008, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) intervened and required that platforms register their loans as 
securities under the Securities Act of 1933.154 These registration requirements 
were met with the same critiques seen in India. The costs and logistics of 
registration force platforms to exit the market and deter new players from 
entering.155 The founder of a leading U.S. P2P platform, Prosper, commented, 
“there should be ten companies up here today. Unfortunately, we’re the only two 
companies [Prosper and Lending Club] that had the capital and the resources to 
survive the securities’ regulatory process.”156 
In response to the impact of SEC registration requirements on the P2P 
industry, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report 
discussing options for regulating P2P platforms going forward.157 The 2011 
report noted that the SEC system of regulation “lacked flexibility and imposed 
inefficient burdens on firms.”158 The GAO report offered an alternative approach 
wherein the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) would regulate P2P 
platforms.159 Under the CFPB, P2Ps would be exempt from federal securities 
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laws and the associated prohibitive registration costs.160 Proponents of this 
approach argue that CFPB can create tailored registration procedures that are 
better suited for P2P management and growth.161 However, critics of the CFPB 
approach argue that moving away from SEC regulation is a drastic step that 
excludes financial experts from regulating a volatile industry.162  
U.S. regulators needed to find a way to encourage growth in a burgeoning 
industry, while managing the unique risks P2P growth poses. Rather than 
continuing with rigid SEC regulations—or opting for a radical new CFPB 
framework—U.S. regulators carved out a new classification for P2Ps within the 
SEC’s purview. In 2012, Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
(JOBS Act) contained provisions for a new class of P2P platforms 
called ”emerging growth companies.”163 As long as their annual revenue is 
below $1 billion USD, and they fall under certain lending thresholds, P2P 
platforms are exempt from SEC registration requirements.164 Even if they must 
comply with SEC registration, the JOBS Act exemption gives P2P platforms the 
option of submitting an initial registration statement to the SEC to address any 
initial comments before a public filing.165 The exemption also allows for tailored 
limits on capital requirements, individual investment limits, and eligibility 
guidelines.166 The emerging growth companies category relaxes some of the 
prohibitive costs and logistics associated with SEC registration, while allowing 
for government regulation of a still largely unpredictable industry.  
The relatively conservative exemption approach of the U.S. is what the 
Indian P2P industry needs. Just as the SEC regulates the U.S. P2P industry, the 
RBI oversees the Indian P2P industry.167 To completely eliminate RBI P2P 
regulations, even with their imperfections, would be a radical shock to an 
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industry that has already scrambled to meet one set of regulations.168 However, 
in a further parallel to early U.S. P2P platforms, Indian P2Ps are struggling under 
rigid and sometimes misinformed regulations.169 Carving out a P2P specific 
category in existing NBFC regulations allows the RBI to tailor regulations to 
meet the needs of Indian P2Ps without resorting to a drastic regulatory overhaul. 
Rather than fully revising primary prudential norms, such as minimum capital 
requirements and leverage ratios, the RBI can create an opt-out regime for P2Ps 
that would be overly burdened. Such an approach leaves the larger NBFC arena 
undisturbed while nurturing a fledgling industry. More so, following the U.S. 
approach allows the RBI to focus on filling in regulatory gaps. Rather than 
pursuing a fundamental regulatory restructuring, the RBI can look towards 
promulgating data security and cross border transaction rules. Finally, nothing 
in this regulatory approach precludes a later revision of the Indian P2P 
landscape. Adopting an exemption approach gives both the RBI and the Indian 
P2P industry time to understand what the P2P landscape needs to grow.  
CONCLUSION 
Encouraging P2P growth is crucial to meeting the banking needs of many 
Indians. However, earlier unchecked P2P growth has shown that without 
regulation, the P2P industry falters. Regulation is necessary to mitigate risks and 
instill confidence in an unfamiliar business model.  
Unfortunately, the RBI framework overregulates an industry it needs to 
nurture. RBI prudential and governance norms have increased entry costs and 
overly burdened existing P2Ps. The capital requirements, leverage ratios, and 
lending caps mandated by the RBI pose a significant threat to the P2P industry. 
Similarly, the areas the RBI leaves unregulated—remittances and data 
security—also jeopardize current P2P operations and future lending. In an 
attempt to legitimize P2P lending, the RBI has fundamentally misunderstood 
how P2P lending actually works. 
P2P platforms are a unique combination of new financial technology and 
traditional banking services. Rather than pigeonholing P2Ps into existing, but 
insufficient, legal categories, the RBI needs to reassess how it regulates P2Ps. 
However, the RBI should not focus its energy on a total regulatory overhaul. 
The Indian P2P industry is still scrambling to adjust to current RBI regulations, 
the effects of which are still not completely understood. The U.S. exemption 
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approach would allow the RBI to tailor regulations while still benefiting from 
the resources and stability of an existing regulatory framework. This approach 
would meet current P2P needs and operate with enough flexibility to allow for 
future P2P growth. The RBI needs to reform regulations to ensure that it does 
not stifle an industry that stands to solve India’s pressing credit access problems.  
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